Abstract: This paper recovers empirically and evaluates the feedback and stance of monetary policy in the United Kingdom throughout the inflation targeting period, implemented since October 1992. Its principal contribution is in comparing two subsamples, before the Bank of England was granted operational independence in May 1997 and after that. Our econometric approach is theoretically motivated by the New Keynesian model and relies on estimating forward-looking Taylor rules via the Generalized Method of Moments from quarterly data. Both final and real-time data, with alternative variable proxies and regression specifications, were used, to find that Taylor rules based on real-time data provide a more reasonable description of British monetary policy. Interestingly, the operational independence subperiod has differed from the pre-independence one -according to our real-time data set -in terms of a weaker response of the Bank of England to inflation but stronger sensitivity to the output gap and a less restrictive stance of monetary policy. Such a reaction would, first of all, characterize the Bank as a flexible inflation targeter, as should be expected by its legal mandate, and not a strict one; secondly, the asymmetry in the feedback function appears justified once the stage in the business cycle is also taken into consideration. JEL classification codes: E52, E58, F41.
Introduction
For thirteen years, monetary policy in the United Kingdom (UK) has been operating in a regime of inflation targeting, from which the last eight years and a half also under operational independence of the central bank. To be more precise, the UK monetary authorities moved to inflation(-forecast) targeting 1 in October 1992, and in May 1997 the Bank of England (BoE) was formally granted operational independence 2 
from Her
Majesty's (HM) Treasury. With a sufficient amount of data for the latter period having accumulated, the contribution of the present paper is to attempt an objective, econometric evaluation of British monetary policy under inflation targeting and, in particular, operational independence. For this purpose, we first introduce the recent institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy in the UK as well as our methodology and then focus on comparing the policy feedback and stance recovered from our sample before and after operational independence. Other types of assessment could, of course, be complementary, yet our idea here is to let the data speak as much as they can. To do so, we rely on a recent approach in empirical monetary policy popularized by Gertler (1998, 2000) , 3 and having solid grounding in New Keynesian macro theory. It involves estimation of forwardlooking Taylor rules incorporating interest rate smoothing via the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed by Hansen (1982) .
We are aware of certain shortcomings in the use of such feedback rules to characterize monetary policy. 4 Yet their simplicity and reliance on statistical facts rather than ('eloquent') ex ante intentions or ex post explanations make them a desirable, impartial and easily interpretable tool for a straightforward analysis of central banks'
policy stance and reaction functions. We believe that some insightful -and sufficiently robust -conclusions we were able to extract from the UK data by recurring to forward-looking Taylor rules have largely justified the employed methodology.
Our main findings are summarized next in a preview. First of all, our empirical study has confirmed that simple forward-looking Taylor 1) a deflationary bias: in fact, the interest rate in the UK was lower, on average, after the move to operational independence;
2) strict inflation targeting, i.e., that the central bank would not react to the output gap: in fact, the Bank of England has responded to the output gap before as well as after receiving operational independence;
3) that the central bank would react in a stronger way to inflation: it may well react in a weaker way, depending on the stage of the business cycle and on whether inflation has been stabilized around target or not; 4) that the central bank would react in a weaker way to the output gap: in fact, the Bank of England has reacted more aggressively (and, in this sense, asymmetrically) to the output gap after receiving operational independence.
All these conclusions can basically be explained, as we argue in the paper, by a unique underlying cause: one just needs to also take into consideration the relevant phase of the business cycle, in particular the dominant (or average) output gap before and after operational independence. We thus present evidence that even a greater degree of central bank independence in addition to a well-established inflation targeting strategy would not imply a 'benign neglect' to the business cycle. Such a result appears consistent with New Keynesian theory, and the policy of the Bank of
England throughout the inflation targeting period -optimally chosen to balance between 'rule' and 'discretion' -deserves credit.
The paper is further down structured as follows. In the next section we summarize the major institutional developments in the British framework for monetary policy making during the 1990s. We then briefly discuss, in section 3, optimal monetary policy and the evolution of feedback rules, while section 4 describes our data and some preliminary tests. Section 5 sketches the theory behind the econometric approach we apply, and section 6 interprets the key lessons to be learnt from our preferred specifications of estimated forward-looking Taylor rules. Section 7 concludes and the Appendix documents the most important features of our data and regression results in a few tables and figures.
The Institutional Framework for UK Monetary Policy since the Early 1990s
It is widely acknowledged that all significant institutional developments in UK monetary policy throughout the 1990s and until now have been implemented following official public announcements. As discussed by Nelson (2003) , among others, these changes in regime could thus be considered exogenous to the economic environment and used for a corresponding 'periodization' of monetary policy in the UK. We summarize below the principal monetary events since the early 1990s and the current policy framework within which the Bank of England operates, as an institutional background for our study.
Recent History
The late 1980s were marked by an implicit convergence of the British sterling to the (also excluded from our estimation), after which our sample starts with the introduction of inflation targeting. This narrative account of the changes in UK monetary policy, reported by a competent and credible primary source of information such as the Bank of England, essentially justifies from an institutional and policy perspective our sample split in two subsamples as well as the respective estimates and comparisons we undertake in the present study. 
Current Goal and Instrument
The current monetary policy framework in the United Kingdom targets inflation but does not ignore, or rather aims to indirectly enhance, other ultimate goals such as economic growth and employment:
"The Bank's monetary policy objective is to deliver price stability -low inflation -and, subject to that, to support the Government's economic objectives including those for growth and employment. Price stability is defined by the Government's inflation target of 2%. The remit recognises the role of price stability in achieving economic stability more generally, and in providing the right conditions for sustainable growth in output and employment. The Government's inflation target is announced each year by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the annual Budget statement.", Bank of
England's website.
But to achieve the inflation target, the Bank acts on the short-term interest rate, which is thus its operating instrument:
"When the Bank of England changes the official interest rate it is attempting to influence the overall level of expenditure in the economy. When the amount of money spent grows more quickly than the volume of output produced, inflation is the result. In this way, changes in interest rates are used to control inflation. … The Bank supplies the cash which the banking system as a whole needs to achieve balance by the end of each settlement day. Because the Bank is the final provider of cash to the system it can choose the interest rate at which it will provide these funds each day. The interest rate at which the Bank supplies these funds is quickly passed throughout the financial system, influencing interest rates for the whole economy.", Bank of England's website.
In this sense, interest rate management preserves crucial importance in an inflation targeting regime as well. This is a good reason to expect that empirical studies based on Taylor rules, such as ours, may characterize UK monetary policy reasonably well. In the original notation, the monetary policy rule Taylor (1993) proposed was:
Theoretical and Empirical Background on Monetary Policy Rules
where r is the federal funds rate, 7 p is the rate of inflation over the previous four quarters and y is the percent deviation of real GDP from a target, approximated by a (linear-)trend real GDP, the latter growing by 2.2% per year for the Taylor (1993) sample In fact, optimal policy rules, i.e., feedback rules derived from explicit models, such as the New Keynesian model of monetary policy (without and with microfoundations)
will not be purely forward-looking, as Woodford (2003), p. 57 (and chapter 7, in detail) has argued. They will usually be both expectations-and history-dependent, as is inflation targeting, and the lead and lag horizons in them will not be too long. We make use of such Taylor rule specifications in the empirical part: they are forwardlooking in inflation and the output gap and backward-looking in the interest rate (a feature known as interest rate smoothing, as will be explained later).
Taylor rules have sometimes also explicitly included one or more (contemporaneous and lagged) exchange rate terms, which appears logical, especially in the case of a small open economy as the UK. Yet Taylor empirical approach usually sticks to conventional specifications, which we also do below.
Instrument Rules vs Targeting Rules
Svensson (1999, 2003) proposed to distinguish targeting rules from interest rate rules of the kind described in the preceding subsection. "According to the formula, the Bank should be willing to adopt a given operating target i t for the overnight interest rate at date t if and only if the Bank's forecast of the evolution of inflation over the next 2 years, conditional upon the interest rate remaining at the level i t , implies an inflation rate of 2.5 percent per annum (the Bank's current inflation target) 2 years after date t."
The essence of the inflation-forecast targeting procedure consists in the fact that there is no formula prescribed for setting the central bank interest rate operating target.
Instead, the BoE is free to set this target at whatever level is consistent with its inflation forecast (or projection) in order to meet a certain target criterion. The latter criterion may well resemble the right-hand side of a forward-looking Taylor rule (without an interest rate smoothing term), as argued by Svensson (1999) .
Given such similarity, we have not discarded the Taylor 
Data and Preliminary Tests
In our Taylor rule estimation we employ standard time series that are common in similar studies. However, we also make use of a few alternative proxies for the explanatory variables, which are of particular relevance for the UK.
Data

Sources and Frequency
All time series were downloaded from the statistical pages on the websites of the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) and the Bank of England (BoE). As mentioned, we work here with quarterly data, mostly because GDP-related data, used to measure the output gap in Taylor rules, are much more precise at a quarterly frequency, although also available at a monthly frequency. This certainly makes our subsamples smaller than if we had recurred to monthly time series. Yet our quarterly estimates turned out most of the time to be both significant in econometric terms and interpretable in economic terms. This is in part because, as Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 2000) and Nelson (2003) have pointed out with respect to their earlier and similar empirical work, the variability of the data involved proves sufficient to produce reasonable results even in relatively small samples.
Variable Proxies
Nominal Short-Term Interest Rate
Following previous Taylor rule papers on the UK, in particular, Nelson (2003) and Martin and Milas (2004) , we assume here that the short-term interest rate supposed to be the operating instrument of the Bank of England is best proxied by the 3-month Treasury bill rate. This is not quite precise, because since operational independence the Bank has been using the 2-week repo rate as its policy instrument. Yet the latter rate has been relatively recently introduced, i.e., in May 1997. As Nelson (2003) points out, the advantage of the 3-month Treasury bill rate is that, being very close to the various different rates -four in total since the early 1970s -that have played the role of operating instrument, 8 it can be used, for greater comparability and with not much loss of precision, to approximate all of them when longer periods are of interest.
Inflation
Inflation is proxied in our study by two alternative indexes that are usual choices when working with UK data:
• the RPI, as in Martin and Milas (2004) and Kesriyeli, Osborn and Sensier (2004), among others; and
• the RPIX, as, for instance, in Nelson (2003) .
As for the consumer price index (CPI), which is the standard measure of inflation in most other economies, including for the purposes of monetary policy, we already noted that it has become the official index accounting for the evolution of the UK general price level only since 2004, and has in this way precluded any possibility to use it in our study.
Output Gap
Our measure for the output gap is, alternatively, constructed out of two available time series:
• the final (or revised) data for GDP, as in the majority of studies on Taylor rules; and
• the real-time (or initially released) data for the same variable, GDP, which were available to policy makers 'in real time', that is, at the time of making decisions on monetary policy: more precisely, we use the series constructed by Nelson and Nikolov (2001) and accessible on the Bank of England's website.
Orphanides (2001, 2003) first argued that real-time data, in addition to being more realistic, might overturn some conclusions about feedback rules based on final data, a point for which we found empirical support here.
Moreover, each of these two types of real GDP series has been filtered by two now standard (although not perfect) procedures to obtain a measure for the output gap, namely:
• by fitting a quadratic trend, as in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) and Nelson (2003) , among others; and
• by a Hodrick-Prescott detrending (with a smoothing parameter of 1600, recommended for quarterly data), as in Martin and Milas (2004) 
Preliminary Tests
Seasonality Tests
Information contained in the files downloaded from the sources of our data, the ONS and the BoE, indicated certain inconsistency of the time series we wished to employ in the Taylor rule estimations with respect to their seasonal adjustment. More precisely, nominal GDP data and the GDP deflator -hence, real GDP, by construction -were provided at their source as seasonally adjusted (sa), whereas both price levels, the RPI and the RPIX, as well as the 3-month Treasury bill rate were not seasonally adjusted (nsa).
We thus performed Census X12 seasonality tests 9 and, consequently, two versions of our Taylor rule regressions:
• with the raw data, as they were from their sources, i.e., with no seasonal adjustment to the RPI, the RPIX and the 3-month Treasury bill rate; and
• with seasonally adjusted -by the Census X12 procedure -respective price levels and interest rate.
We did so because of certain criticisms in the literature in the sense that deseasonalization techniques may diminish or eliminate important features of the raw time series and thus give rise to findings that do not necessarily reflect genuine correlations across the data. On the other hand, it seemed to us somewhat inconsistent not to employ seasonally adjusted prices and interest rates side by side with (final) GDP data that were anyway seasonally adjusted at the source. We later on duly report both types of results, nsa and sa.
Stationarity Tests
A typical preliminary procedure in time series analysis, to avoid spurious regressions, is to test for (non)stationarity of the included variables. In the particular case of Taylor rule estimation, however, this has not been systematically done in most of the previous literature. To address the issue, we employed augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests based on autoregressive models in parallel with kernel-based Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests, with the null for both tests being that of a unit root (i.e., nonstationarity) present. These two tests were further supplemented by a test constructed on the opposite null, of stationarity, namely the Kwiatkowski-PhillipsSchmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, and both autoregressive and kernel-based specifications of it were used. 10 We generally found that the price levels, RPI and RPIX, could be either I(1) or I(2).
Hence, inflation could be either stationary or not, depending on the chosen proxy and test. The 3-month Treasury bill rate and the real GDP gap obtained from quadratictrend fitting could not be treated with certainty neither as stationary nor as I (1) variables either, because of mixed findings from the alternative unit root tests and specifications within each test we resorted to. Only the real GDP gap obtained from
Hodrick-Prescott detrending appeared to be most likely I(0). Bearing in mind the notorious low power of unit root tests, in particular, in short samples such as ours, we, after all, followed the New Keynesian theory of monetary policy and effected Taylor rule estimation in the standard way, as also argued and done by Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1998, 2000) . These authors defend the key assumptions in their workstationarity of inflation and the nominal interest rate, as we shall also assume hereby stressing that they are both empirically and theoretically plausible.
The NNS-GMM Approach to Estimating Forward-Looking Taylor Rules
Our empirical strategy was to apply a common and theoretically consistent method to estimate forward-looking Taylor This model is usually the baseline New Keynesian model described in King and Woolman (1996) and Yun (1996) , among others, and also called -first by Goodfriend and King (1997) and in a broader context -the New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) model. It is not necessary for our purposes here to write down this model completely, because such sticky-price analytical frameworks have been well explored -see, for instance, Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), Walsh (2003) and Woodford (2003) . We would rather sketch its relevance to our estimation below, by simply stating its 'core' equations and then relating them to the forward-looking feedback rules we estimated.
After log-linearization around a zero inflation steady state, the equilibrium conditions of the baseline New Keynesian (or NNS) model are embodied in four equations, which -following Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) in ignoring certain constant terms, but using a more explicit for our purposes notation -can be written as:
[ ] curve. π t is the rate of inflation. I t is the information set available at time t. δ is the discount factor and λ the output elasticity of inflation. 
T is the desired (constant) nominal interest rate when inflation is at its target level and output is at potential. (5) is the empirical counterpart of (3) ...
. In (6), β i (L) measures the degree of smoothing of interest rate changes and ν t is a zero mean exogenous interest rate shock. Equation (6) is, in turn, the empirical counterpart of (4) above.
Plugging the Taylor rule target (5) into the partial adjustment model (6), 
where is the 'equilibrium' real interest rate and
.
It can be seen in (9) that the error term ε t is a linear combination of forecast errors of inflation and the output gap (in curly brackets) and the exogenous disturbance to the interest rate ν t . It is thus orthogonal to any variable in the information set I t available at time t.
Sketch of the Econometrics: GMM
Now let z t denote a vector of variables within the central bank's information set at the time when the decision on the interest rate is made -that is, z t ∈ I t . As Clarida-Galí- 
These orthogonality conditions provide the basis for the estimation of the parameters of interest, collected in the vector β ≡ (β 0,+k β π,+k β x,+q β i,-1 )', applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) due to Hansen (1982) . Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000) note that, by construction, the first component of {ε t } follows an MA(a) process, with a = max {k,q} -1 and will thus be serially correlated unless k = q = 1.
For that reason, the GMM estimation should be carried out with a weighting matrix that is robust to autocorrelation, as we also do. Moreover, to the extent that the dimension of vector z t is higher than the number of parameters to estimate, (10) implies some overidentifying restrictions that can be tested in order to assess the validity of the specification estimated as well as the set of instruments used. We present such test statistics in Table 2 in the Appendix and discuss them further down.
The test rests on the logic exposed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998), pp. 1040-1041. We estimated directly via GMM equation (11) and then recovered the structural-form parameters (the β's) from the reduced-form parameters (the b's) using the correspondence in the definitions (12) through (15) . Standard errors for the policy responses of interest (the β's), reported in Table 2 , were consequently computed by an application of the delta method. 
Key Results
Let us now look in more detail at our key results. Table 1 We analyze and interpret our principal findings along two dimensions. We start by some comments on the parameters of the central bank's reaction function extracted from the UK data, essentially comparing their magnitudes before and after operational independence. We then move to a more general discussion of the stance of Bank of England's monetary policy. In both dimensions of the analysis, we would emphasize our quantitative results obtained from real-time (and nsa) data, and not final (and sa) data, for reasons that are made clear further down. Table 2 reports the policy response coefficients from an identical forward-looking Taylor rule, equation (11) To judge about the magnitude of the parameters in the Bank of England's policy reaction function, we had to also make a choice concerning the appropriate variable proxies. Otherwise the results vary, sometimes considerably in quantitative terms, although rather weakly in a qualitative sense. We present two types of estimates, based on two particular sets of underlying quarterly data, namely, what can be called 'real-time' data and 'final' data. Thus, the first two columns in Table 2 (in panels A and B) report our estimates based on 'real-time' data, that is, the RPIX (nsa) to calculate inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill (nsa) to define the short-term interest rate and real-time GDP data to approximate the output gap; in the latter case, results from both Hodrick-Prescott and quadratic detrending are given. The last two columns in Table 2 (in panels A and B) compare, instead, the respective coefficients obtained from 'final' data, that is, when the RPI (sa) -and not the RPIX (sa) 13 -defines inflation, the 3-month Treasury bill (sa) serves as the short-term interest rate and final real GDP data approximate the output gap; again, estimates for both Hodrick-Prescott and quadratic detrending are reported. As can be verified in the last row of both panels A and B in Table 2 , the validity of our overidentifying restrictions and of the set of our instruments cannot be rejected for all eight reported regressions.
Bank of England's Policy Reaction Function under Inflation Targeting
The combination of the annual change in the RPIX (nsa) as an inflation proxy and real-time GDP data as a basis to approximate the output gap (reflected in the first, 'real-time' pair of columns in Table 2 ) was the policy relevant and only available set of information to the Bank of England at the time of actual monetary policy making.
Moreover, this particular choice of variable proxies was also much better supported by our econometric results, relative to the combination of RPI (sa) and final GDP data (underlying the results highlighted in the last, 'final' pair of columns in Table 2 ). For example, the goodness of fit in Panel B for the final set of data appears unreasonably high; together with the very high lagged dependent variable coefficients, this is problematic and may be a sign of misspecification. Furthermore, the statistical significance of some of the coefficients of interest in the last two columns of Table 2 is not assured either.
Our findings confirm, first of all, the point made by Orphanides (2001 Orphanides ( , 2003 : in all four specifications based on 'real-time' data the goodness of fit is high enough, but without being suspiciously high; then, all coefficients except one (15 out of 16) are statistically significant at all conventional levels; moreover, the positive expected signs of the response to both inflation and the output gap and the bounds well away from the extremes of 0 and 1 of the smoothing parameter are always satisfied. This is a second reason, in addition to realism (or relevance), to place greater weight and confidence on our estimates from the 'real-time' data set relative to the corresponding 'final' set.
We next look at the magnitude of the Bank of England's reaction function coefficients, in particular before and after operational independence. As explained, we would mostly emphasize the quantitative dimension of our results obtained from the 'real-time' data.
Reaction to Inflation
What appeared to us unexpected, at least at an initial glance, was that the (positive) magnitude of the coefficient to inflation had declined in the post-independence subsample relative to the pre-independence subsample. More precisely, this decline -captured by our 'real-time' (but not 'final') data -is rather moderate: the quadratic specification registers a drop of β π,+2 from 0.67 to 0.50 and the Hodrick-Prescott one from 0.81 to 0.50 (with that latter coefficient only marginally insignificant at the 10% level). Interestingly, both estimated versions (quadratic and Hodrick-Prescott) agree exactly on the response to inflation after operational independence, which is quantified at 0.50. This particular magnitude as well as the higher values extracted from the 'real-time' data for the pre-independence period are furthermore smaller than unity, so that the policy response during the inflation targeting period has been rather mitigated (or inelastic). Most of our alternative specifications with various underlying proxies seem overall to confirm that the reaction to inflation has been somewhat weakened in the post-independence relative to the pre-independence sample (although an exception can be seen in the 'final' data columns of Table 2 ).
A likely reason for the weaker policy response to inflation can, of course, be the decline in the rate of inflation itself, observed since the mid-1990s not only in Britain but in most developed countries. This trend to lower inflation is partly due to more prudent and technocratic policy making in these countries, but also partly a consequence of a favorable economic environment both globally and nationally, as we shall see below for the UK. Hence, any precise quantification of the contribution of inflation targeting and operational independence to a lower inflation rate in Britain, as well as across the industrialized world, remains an issue for further study. Yet it would be difficult to deny the success of inflation targeting in anchoring inflation expectations, and here the UK case is particularly illustrative. Moreover, low and stable inflation would further contribute to growth, by stabilizing at a low level the real rate of interest. In this sense, exploring the implications of the assumption for a constant 'equilibrium' RIR, inherent in the Clarida-Galí-Gertler (1998, 2000) GMM approach we utilized, offers another avenue for future research.
Interest Rate Smoothing
According to our 'real-time' set of UK data, the degree of interest rate smoothing appears to have declined considerably in the post-independence period, of the order of two to three times. The corresponding 'final' data numbers in Table 2 , however, suggest a slight increase. Therefore this matter is likewise left for additional investigation.
Reaction to the Output Gap
As far as the policy response to the output gap is concerned, our overall econometric results from both employed data sets were largely supportive -in qualitative and, to a substantial extent, also quantitative terms -to what Table 2 selectively reports in its first pair of columns. Most of our specifications that make good sense both economically and econometrically have produced statistically significant and positive estimates for the coefficient to the contemporaneous output gap, β x,0 . Moreover, they indicate almost unanimously (although an exception can be seen in the 'final' data Hodrick-Prescott column of Table 2 ) a considerable rise in the magnitude of this parameter in the post-independence period: of the order of two times and a half, according to the 'real-time' data set. This quite robust finding at first appeared puzzling. In trying to understand it, we had to relate it to the stage of the business cycle, in particular, before and after operational independence.
Let us compare the (dominant) phase of the UK business cycle by looking again at the descriptive statistics in Table 1 and did seem to act so (in our empirical results), in a stage of the business cycle above or close to potential output when inflationary pressures increase and put at risk the credibly stabilized inflation at target.
Bank of England's Monetary Policy Stance under Inflation Targeting
To discuss now the stance of British monetary policy in the spirit of Taylor (1993), we re-estimated equation (11) with k = 2 and q = 0 over the whole inflation targeting period (and using both our final and real-time data sets). We begin by noting the following facts. First, the 3-month Treasury bill rate has been mostly trending up before operational independence and down after that; second, its average level has also been lower in the post-independence subsample (see Figure 1 and, for numerical values, Table 1 given that by the late 1990s inflation expectations in the UK had already been firmly anchored at the target inflation of 2.5% p.a.
Concluding Comments
This paper recovered and evaluated empirically the reaction function and the stance of 5. The main reason for this exclusion has been claimed to be that the mortgage rate tends to move closely with Bank of England's operating instrument.
6. The normative implication has emerged from stochastic simulation of a number of econometric models Taylor (1993) ; OvId p-v = probability value of the Hansen test of (9 = 13 instruments -4 parameters to estimate) overidentifying restrictions. (11) via GMM, as explained in the Note to Table 2 , over the whole sample. Table 2 , over the whole sample. (11) via GMM, as explained in the Note to Table 2 , over the whole sample. Table 2 , over the whole sample.
